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CASES NOTED
CONTRACTS OF AN INFANT-
THE NECESSARY AUTOMOBILE
The plaintiff, a minor, bought a new car from the defendant seller.
The plaintiff used the car for seven months and then elected to disaffirm
the purchase by notifying the seller of his intention and by offering to
return the vehicle upon a refund of the purchase price. The plaintiff then
brought suit to rescind the contract and to have the purchase price re-
funded in full. The trial court entered judgment for the seller, stating
that the car was a necessity for the plaintiff and that recission would not
be allowed. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held, affirmed: The fact that the car was used by the plaintiff to carry
on his school, business and social activities supported the chancellor's
finding that the car was a necessity. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff
were entitled to recission, the seller could set-off the depreciation in value
from the date of sale up to the time of disaffirmance. Rose v. Sheehan
Buick, Inc., 204 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
Generally, an infant has the right to disaffirm or avoid his contracts
while still a minor or within a reasonable time after reaching his majority.1
The contracts of a minor are thus voidable, not void, and are valid until
the minor elects to disaffirm. The reason for giving the infant the right
to avoid his contracts was stated by the Supreme Court of Florida in
1911:
The right of an infant to avoid his contract is one con-
ferred by law for his protection against his own improvidence
and the designs of others; and, though its exercise is not in-
frequently the occasion of injury to others who have in good
faith dealt with him, this is a consequence which they might
have avoided by declining to enter into the contract. It is the
policy of the law to discourage adults from contracting with
infants .... 2
A major exception to the right of disaffirmance is that the minor is
liable for any "necessaries" he buys. This exception, in part a recognition
of the hardship often wrought on those who deal with infants, is rational-
ized on the basis that the imprudence of the minor in purchasing neces-
sities is immaterial except as to the price agreed to be paid.
The problem with the exception is how to define it in its correct
application. For example, in the instant case, the problem is whether
an automobile is a necessity for which an infant is liable. In describing
what constitutes a necessity, Lord Coke stated:
[A]n infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat,
drinke, apparell, necessary physicke, and likewise for his good
1. S. W=sToN, CONTRACTS 1 226 (3d ed. 1959).
2. Putnal v. Walker, 61 Fla. 720, 721, 55 So. 844, 845 (1911).
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teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himself after-
ward.$
Modern courts look upon necessaries as a relative term' including
even things used for the comfort of the minor. 5 However, the courts gen-
erally have not regarded the automobile as a necessary for the minor.6
Where an automobile is used solely for pleasure or for the enhancement
of social status it cannot be a necessary and the minor may disaffirm the
contract of sale.7 Close questions arise where the minor uses the car to
commute to and from work. Even where the place of employment is five
or ten miles away, however, courts have been reluctant to find the minor
liable on his contract of purchase," especially where other means of
transportation are available to the minor, such as another family car,
public transportation, or the opportunity to walk.9 Probably what is
required by most courts is that the automobile be an actual necessity used
by the infant to earn his livelihood.1"
It is difficult to find a case where an automobile was held to be a
necessity before the Mid-1950's. Recently a few courts, because of the
3. E. CoIE, INSTITUTES OF LAW OF ENGLAND J 172(a) (1797).
4. [Tlhere is no hard and fast rule by which it may be determined just what is
and what is not requisite for the reasonable convenience of a minor, and . . . that
question is one which must, of necessity, depend upon the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case ....
Braham & Co. v. Zittel, 232 App. Div. 406, 409, 250 N.Y.S. 44, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
5. "Necessaries," in the technical sense, mean such things as are necessary to the
support, use or comfort of the person of the minor, as food, raiment, lodging,
medical attendance, and such personal comforts as comport with his condition and
circumstances in life, including a common school education; but it has been pithly
and happily said, that necessaries do not include "horses, saddles, bridles, liquors,
pistols, powder, whips and fiddles."
Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind. 310, 314 (1878).
6. Annot., 78 A.L.R. 392 (1932).
7. Crockett Motor Co. v. Thompson, 177 Ark. 495, 6 S.W.2d 834 (1928) (car used
only for pleasure is not a necessity); Pelham v. Howard Motors, Inc., 20 III. App. 2d 528,
156 N.E. 597 (1959); Bowling v. Sperry, 133 Ind. App. 692, 184 N.E.2d 901 (1962). See
also Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975 (1924), where the
court said that an automobile could not be considered as a necessary for a girl or boy under
18 years of age.
8. Harris v. Raughton, 37 Ala. 648, 73 So.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1954) (automobile was not
a necessity, even though the minor was married and purchased the auto for use as a con-
veyance to and from employment which was a distance of 8 miles); Schoenung v. Gallet,
206 Wis. 52, 238 N.W. 852 (1931) (automobile was not a necessity for the personal use or
support of the minor; the mere fact that his place of employment was three miles from
the home of his parents, with whom he lived, did not necessitate his ownership of an
automobile).
9. Perry Auto Co. v. Mainland, 229 Iowa 187, 294 N.W. 281 (1940). (The distance to
work was one and a half miles. When the minor had an auto he used it, when he did not,
he walked.) Schoenung v. Gallet, 206 Wis. 52, 238 N.W. 852 (1931) (brother's auto was
available for transportation).
10. Russell v. Buck, 116 Vt. 40, 68 A.2d 691 (1949) (even though trucking was the
only means by which the infant supported his family, the court held that the truck was
not a necessity since the use of the truck was not the only means of earning a livelihood
open to the infant) ; Robertson v. King, 225 Ark. 276, 280 S.W.2d 402 (1955) (pickup truck
was not a necessity, where it appeared that the purchaser-minor had quit school and was
earning his own living).
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ever-increasing distances involved in commuting, have expressed the more
realistic view that an automobile may be a necessary link in the chain
of physical survival in today's world. Commenting on a contractual ar-
rangement made by a minor for transportation to his job, the Supreme
Court of Kansas stated:
It might be said that earlier in the history of our country,
when industry was centralized in cities or industrial commu-
nities where housing was adequate and public transportation, by
way of the streetcar, the bus or the community train, was avail-
able to all, private transportation was not necessary for one
getting to and from his work. However, since World War II
there has been a tremendous growth in our country's population,
and in this highly industrial age, where industry has the tend-
ency to decentralize and move to less populated or rural com-
munities within which there is a shortage of housing and very
little, if any, public transportation available, the worker is, as
a result, required to commute long distances to and from his
place of employment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
private transportation for the worker is now a necessity.1'
The court took notice of the fact that in order for the minor to hold his
job, he had to get to and from work. Therefore, the arrangement was
necessary insofar as the minor was concerned. 2
Because of the rapid changes in our way of life, courts in the future,
as the court in the instant case, will undoubtedly recognize the fact that
an automobile is, for many minors, a necessity.
The court was also faced with the issue of whether the seller has a
right to a deduction for the use or depreciation of goods purchased by
an infant.
Although given the right to disaffirm a contract, an infant should not
be able to retain an advantage from his dealings with an adult. Therefore,
upon disaffirmance, the infant must return the property in his possession.'
However, if the infant has disposed of the goods, generally he still has
a right to disaffirm and is not required to place the other party in status
quo.1
4
11. Ehrsam v. Borgen, 185 Kan. 776, 780, 347 P.2d 260, 263 (1960).
12. Id.
13. See generally S. Wn.ITSTON, CONTRACTS § 238 (3 ed. 1955). Some jurisdictions have
broadened this rule to require the infant to return either the property which remains in his
hands in specie or any other property which the specific property was exchanged for. See
In re Bierman, 271 F. Supp 774, 776 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
The prerequisite of returning the auto prior to the disaffirmance is not always helpful
to the seller since the limitation of goods in the minor's possession may come into play.
For example, a minor may have the car in his possession but a finance company will be
holding title. Upon disaffirmance the auto would be returned but not the title. See Keser v.
Chagnon, 159 Colo. 209, 410 P.2d 637 (1966).
14. MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688 (1897) (the minor need only return the fruits
of the contract that are then in his possession and if for any reason he cannot place the
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Most courts refuse to allow the vendor any set-off for depreciation
and permit the infant to recover the entire purchase price or as much
of it as has been paid. 15 The reason given by these courts for not allowing
the seller a deduction is that depreciation due to the minor's use or misuse
is a result of the very improvidence from which the law seeks to protect
the minor and which those who deal with him must anticipate. One court
has said:
The infant is not required to account for the use or depre-
ciation of the property while in his possession, or for its loss, if
squandered or destroyed, for this is the very improvidence
against which the law seeks to protect him."6
A minority of jurisdictions, however, along with the court in the
instant case, would permit the seller to deduct for use and depreciation. 7
The reasoning of these courts, as seen in the following language, is that
the minor should as a matter of justice be held accountable for his use of
the property up to the time he disaffirms the contract:
[T] he plaintiff, having had the use of the bicycle during the
time intervening between her purchase and its return, ought, in
justice and in fairness, to account for its reasonable use or de-
terioration in value. Otherwise she would be making use of the
privilege of infancy as a sword, and not as a shield. In the
absence of wanton injury to the property, the value of the use
would be deemed to include the deterioration in value ....
Since the instant case was an equitable cause of action, the court
based its reasoning for allowing a depreciation deduction on the equitable
maxim "he who seeks equity must do equity." For a comparison, the
court cited the United States Supreme Court case of Myers v. Hurley
Motor Company.'9 The distinction between Myers and the instant case
is that in Myers the infant had fraudulently represented that he was an
adult; whereas in the instant case the minor at no time held himself out
other party in status quo, he does not because of such inability lose his right to disaffirm) ;
Weathers v. Owen, 78 Ga. 520, 51 S.E.2d 584 (App. Ct. 1949); Bowling v. Sperry, 133
Ind. App. 692, 184 N.E.2d 901 (1962).
15. Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975 (1924);
Utterstrom v. Kidder, 124 Me. 10, 124 A. 725 (1924); Reynolds v. Garber-Buick Co., 183
Mich. 157, 149 N.W. 985 (1915) (regardless of wear which he has given it, the minor may
recover back the money paid for the automobile) ; Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc., 197 N.C.
659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929).
16. Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, 197 N.C. 659, 660, 150 S.E. 177, 178 (1929).
17. Rodriguez v. Northern Auto Auction, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 395, 225 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup.
Ct. 1962); Scalone v. Talley Motors, Inc., 3 App. Div. 674, 158 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct.
1957); Rice v. Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 55 NE. 275 (1897) (bicycle); Petit v. Liston, 97
Ore. 464, 191 P. 660 (1920) (motorcycle).
18. Rice v. Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 580,55 N.E. 275, 276 (1897).
In Toon v. Mack Intl Motor Truck Co., 87 Cal. App. 151, 262 P. 51 (1927), the
vendor was even allowed to recover for depreciation in excess of amounts paid to him by
the infant.
19. 273 U.S. 18 (1927).
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to be an adult.2° In Myers, the Court first decided that, although the
authority was in conflict,2 ' the minor was not estopped to maintain an
action by reason of his misrepresentations. On the question of whether the
defendant seller may, by way of affirmative defense against the minor
plaintiff's claim, set-off the amount for use, the court stated:
How far the equitable maxim, that he who seeks equity
must do equity, applies generally in suits brought for relief be-
cause of infancy, we need not inquire .... The maxim applies,
at least, where there has been, as there was here, actual fraud
on the part of the infant. When an infant of mature appearance,
by false and fraudulent representations as to his age, has in-
duced another person to sell and deliver property to him, it is
against natural justice to permit the infant to recover money
paid for the property without first compelling him to account
for the injury which his deceit has inflicted upon the other
person .
22
The court in the instant case, by stating that it would recognize the
seller's right to depreciation if the minor were allowed to rescind the
contract, seemed to balance properly the equities in an effort to find a
line of distinction between protecting the minor and preventing him from
using his privilege of contractual avoidance so as to do injustice to others.
To be sure, a minor has an interest that the law should protect, but it
should be accomplished with the least possible injury to those who deal
with him. The sanctity of infancy should not be preserved when justice
requires a remedy for his innocent victims.
ROBERT H. MCMANUS
20. The court in the instant case held that the mere fact that the minor "might have
had the appearance of a person over twenty-one years of age could not constitute misrepre-
sentation." Rose v. Sheehan Buick, Inc. 204 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
21. See generally S. WILISTON, CONTRACTS '§ 245 (3d ed. 1955). If the infant is guilty
of actual misrepresentation of his age the authorities are not uniform, but the view is
generally accepted that the minor is not precluded from disaffirming his contracts. For a
Florida case, however, where the minor was estopped to disaffirm his purchase, see Mosler
Acceptance Co. v. Perlman, 47 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1950).
22. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18, 26 (1927).
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